Court Filed Document Raises Questions Over HP’s Statements

Introduction

In November 2012, HP accused the former management of Autonomy of accounting misrepresentations and wrote off $8.8 billion of the value of its acquisition of the company. Since then, HP has consistently avoided providing any specific details in support of its allegations. On Friday, 5th September 2014, HP filed paperwork to a US court that sheds a lot of light on what went on.

The document submitted by HP’s lawyers, is the Independent Committee’s Resolution Regarding Shareholder Derivative Claims and Demands, commissioned by Meg Whitman and the Board of HP. The filing of this report went unnoticed as HP buried it in a mass of documents supplemental to their original filing, which they used to divert press attention with an out-of-context email.

This report, together with some accompanying evidence released today by the former management of Autonomy, reveals the truth about the circumstances of the purchase. It also provides evidence that HP claims that it was unaware that Autonomy derived part of its revenue from the sale of hardware are no longer supportable.

We can also prove today that HP included those hardware sales in its own valuation of Autonomy.

In addition, the document reveals that:

  • HP’s aggressive assumptions led it to believe it could find some $7.4 billion in synergies
  • KPMG found no “material issues” with Autonomy’s accounting
  • HP had Autonomy on its acquisition target list from 2006
  • HP conducted a speedy but thorough due diligence process because they were afraid of competitive bids
  • The HP “whistleblower” was not knowledgeable about how Autonomy did its accounting in the UK, or the IFRS accounting rules Autonomy reported under
  • HP’s CFO and General Counsel opposed the acquisition of Autonomy

The Real Reason for the Write-Down

The new information received makes clear the real reason for the write down was because of the unprecedented level of synergies assumed in the deal by HP.

The report filed on 5 September 2014, reveals for the first time that HP built into its valuation of Autonomy “$7.4 billion in revenue synergies” (p33). At the time of the purchase, Autonomy had a stand-alone market value of approximately $6 billion.

The filing goes on to reveal that $5.3 billion of the “originally projected synergies” (p45) of $7.4 billion, was written off. This accounts for the majority of the write down. A further $3.6 billion write down was described by HP as being “linked to the recent trading value of HP stock and headwinds against anticipated synergies and marketplace performance” (20 November 2012 HP press release). Nothing, therefore, to do with Autonomy. The write down is quantified at $8.9 billion purely from synergy loss and and a decline in stock value. This is a reversal of the original statements in November 2012 that the “majority” of the write down (more than $5 billion) was due to “accounting misrepresentations”. The total write down on the day was $8.8 billion of the purchase price of $11 billion.

Not surprisingly, the new information also reveals that “E&Y could not “audit” quantification of Autonomy’s accounting errors” (p47).

The filing informs us that CFO Cathy Lesjak foretold this when she opposed the deal “HP’s history of not executing on its major acquisitions” (p34).

Autonomy’s management cannot be held responsible for HP’s excessive forecasting of synergies. The write off is due to HP’s own recklessness and not due to any accounting improprieties.

The synergies were predicated on taking sales people from HP to expand the Autonomy salesforce, taking services people from HP to increase Autonomy services, and closer integration between Autonomy products and the hardware divisions.[1] The new information shines further light on the sources of the synergies: “HP’s footprint could be leveraged from a sales, customer, geographical and technology perspective to maximize revenue synergies” (p37).

CFO Opposed Acquisition of Autonomy

The report reveals CFO Cathy Lesjak’s opposition to the acquisition:

“The Board’s non-management directors met on August 17, 2011, principally to consider in executive session the opposition/concerns expressed at the August 16 meeting by HP’s CFO Lesjak that, while the strategic vision underlying the Autonomy acquisition should be respected and embraced, she opposed the acquisition of Autonomy at that time because (i) the size of the premium would concern shareholders, (ii) HP’s bankers had underestimated the impact of the acquisition on HP’s stock price, as well as the likely negative shareholder sentiment and that (iii) HP’s history of not executing on its major acquisitions did not counsel proceeding with the acquisition at that time. The General Counsel agreed.” (p.34)

Hardware Sales

In its original allegations of November 20, 2012, Hewlett-Packard expressed surprise that Autonomy sold hardware, accused the company of accounting for it wrongfully and of deceiving its auditors on this matter. HP claimed this amounted to much of the $150-200 million of sales over two years it claimed was “mischaracterized” by Autonomy. Once HP started down this path even as information has come to light showing it was wrong, and HP itself had knowledge that it was wrong, but it has been forced to continue.

When HP accused the former management of Autonomy of accounting irregularities, it blamed the majority of these on “hardware booked as software”, and claimed that it was unaware that Autonomy was anything other than a software-only company until a “whistleblower” came forward to point it out.

However, what this report now proves categorically, is that HP knew about Autonomy’s hardware sales well over a year before they made their public accusation.

In public class action filings, HP have admitted that senior HP accounting staff, KPMG and E&Y reviewed a number of documents in November 2011 without recorded surprise or alarm. The new information reveals the following:

  •  “E&Y’s November 2 – 4 2011 review of Deloitte work papers ….identified Autonomy’s hardware revenue, which E&Y reported to HP” (p40)
  •  “In the course of E&Y’s exposure to Deloitte’s work papers for the purpose of establishing an opening balance sheet…E&Y noted that Autonomy sold material quantities of hardware. E&Y reported its observation to HP management”. (p57)
  • KPMG’s post-Acquisition identification of $41 million in pre-Acquisition “Pass – through” hardware sales was appropriately conveyed by both KPMG and HP management to Autonomy management for explanation……Autonomy’s management ultimately responded that Autonomy procured hardware as well as software for certain strategic accounts” (p39)
  •  ”In its post-closing balance sheet review, KPMG found evidence of hardware sales and made inquiries about them” (p56)

Documents show that senior officers of Hewlett-Packard were, in fact, well aware of Autonomy’s hardware sales, and the accounting of these, from day one almost a year before the announcement of its write down of Autonomy. These statements, and others made on that day, are untrue, as is shown by the documents posted below.

To recap, on 20th November 2012, senior management of Hewlett-Packard made a series of allegations that these documents show to be misleading. John Schultz, HP General Counsel, said Autonomy, “resold desktop computers … and recorded those sales so they appeared to be software revenue,”[1] that there was “active concealment”[2] and that there wasn’t “a set of well-maintained books … critical documents were missing from the obvious places”[3].

Meg Whitman said that HP, “relied on audited financials, audited by Deloitte, not brand X accounting firm, but Deloitte and, by the way, during our very extensive due diligence process, we hired KPMG to audit Deloitte, and neither of them saw what we now see after someone came forward to point us in the right direction.”[4] Speaking to reporters that same day, CFO Cathy Lesjak said the “hardware sales were frequently reported as licenses.”[5] These allegations were repeated in last Friday’s filing.[6]

In fact, Autonomy was fully open and transparent with its auditors, and all financial documents, including audit committee reports were kept at the company’s headquarters in Cambridge. The most important financial documents in the Company are the quarterly financial audit review packs. HP and its advisors had access to these from day one.

Hardware in Audit Packs

The first three documents are examples from Deloitte’s quarterly presentations to Autonomy’s audit committee – the very same working papers that were reviewed by E&Y and HP – from when Autonomy was listed on the London Stock Exchange (of 10 such quarterly presentations that took place during the period in question by Hewlett-Packard’s allegations). In these, Deloitte discussed Autonomy’s hardware sales, how they were accounted for (including accounting for some of the discount as a marketing expense), and discussed the disclosure of this information to the market. The documents show that the auditors were completely aware of the hardware sales, which were in no way concealed or booked as software and were referred to as “hardware”. These audit packs were the most concise summary of each quarter’s accounting and were available to Hewlett Packard from the day they acquired the company (being a whole year before the announcement of the write-down).

Deloitte’s report to the Autonomy Audit Committee Q1 2011 clearly showing hardware sales as hardware, their amount, the fact that they are taken at a loss and the associated accounting

Deloitte’s report to the Autonomy Audit Committee Q2 2011 clearly showing hardware sales as hardware, their amount, the fact that they are taken at a loss and the associated accounting

Deloitte’s report to the Autonomy Audit Committee Q2 2010

Extract from Hewlett Packard court filing in California 5 June 2014. Paul Curtis was HP’s head of worldwide revenue recognition who scrutinised Autonomy’s accounts without raising any issues.

Hardware booked as software?

On November 20th 2012, John Schultz made the statement that Autonomy had “booked hardware as software revenue.” While this is clearly not the case from the Deloitte audit committee reports, it is also not true when one looks at the ‘Trial Balance’ (TB) or formal ledgers of the company recording all items bought and sold. In the excerpts from the Trial Balances below, you can see the entry line 470000 “hardware revenue” and the corresponding revenue. Line 570000 shows the cost of goods of hardware. Thus, it is clear that hardware is being booked as hardware, and not software and it shows the amounts involved.

Ledger entry October 31, 2011 showing hardware bought and sold including cost of goods

Emails show senior HP accounting staff using this Trial Balance for many operations from November 2011 onwards. It was obvious to these staff members that Autonomy sold these amounts of hardware. Furthermore, these trial balances are also shown in a number of emails being used by KPMG taking on accounting work on behalf of HP.

Autonomy’s hardware sales were also well known amongst the leadership team of HP. Dave Donatelli, at the time head of ESSN (Enterprise Software and Server Networking) and a member of the Executive Committee, was well aware of the resale of EMC and Dell hardware well before any whistleblower came forward and 10 months before the write down in November 2012.

Email from Autonomy employee to HP employee showing Dave Donatelli, head of ESSN, had awareness of Autonomy hardware transactions.

It was also clearly known that Autonomy sometimes sold hardware to its customers at a loss for strategic reasons. Chris Yelland, who reported directly to Cathy Lesjak HP’s CFO, was one of the most senior accountants in HP’s software division. He sent an email on March 22, 2012 discussing payment to Dell for hardware explained as “hardware orders that we source from them and sell to our customers at a loss of 10%.”

Email exchange dated March 2012 among HP employees showing they discussed Autonomy hardware transactions. Chris Yelland was a senior HP finance employee who was transferred to Autonomy in April 2012.

On 3rd May 2012, there is another email exchange between Mr Yelland and an employee that also makes explicit reference to hardware.

Email dated early May 2012 showing a senior HP accountant knew about, and was happy with, Autonomy hardware transactions.

Similarly, an email dated January 6, 2012 from Meeta Sunderwala, a senior member of HP’s mergers and acquisitions accounting team, explicitly discusses Dell payables and explains that for many strategic accounts Autonomy procured hardware as well as software. There are many more such emails showing that senior HP staff were well aware of Autonomy’s hardware business, how it was accounted and booked long before the alleged whistleblower came forward.

Email dated January 2012 showing a senior HP accountant was fully aware of Autonomy’s hardware transactions.

In short, the above are just three examples from the many hundreds of documents showing that many senior HP staff and HP’s advisors knew that the statement made by John Schultz on 20th November 2012 expressing surprise at Autonomy’s hardware sales, at the fact that some of them were made at a loss, were untrue. They also show that these were not hidden from Autonomy’s auditors and it is also untrue to say that they were booked as software. These documents show that HP lied about its knowledge of hardware sales and the associated accounting. It was well aware of the facts at some of the most senior levels of the company well before the “whistleblower” on May 25, 2012.

 Autonomy valuation by HP included hardware

HP has said that one of the reasons for the write down in the value of the company was that it did not realize that hardware was being sold. The report filed on 5th September, however, shows clearly that it was well aware of hardware sales and it also shows that the valuation of the company included hardware.

  • “In the course of E&Y’s exposure to Deloitte’s work papers for the purpose of establishing an opening balance sheet…E&Y noted that Autonomy sold material quantities of hardware. E&Y reported its observation to HP management”. (p57)
  • “The Autonomy purchase price allocation was prepared by Duff & Phelps. E&Y then audited that allocation were disclosed in HP’s FY 2011 Report on Form 10K (p57). The 10K was signed by HP directors on December 14 2011.

What this shows is that the value of the company at $11 billion fully included hardware sales therefore it is clear that six months later these same hardware sales cannot be used to justify a change in the valuation.

Economic Partners (EP) was a firm that HP employed to conduct a tax valuation of Autonomy. It included the hardware, and came out at $11.19 billion. This valuation was used for various statutory purposes, and was reviewed by HP and E&Y.

This email exchange from February 2012 shows that Economic Partners’ third-party valuation of Autonomy, which included the hardware, was used by HP with tax authorities.

This filing on September 5th  also shows that HP’s basis for its valuation was built on discounted cashflow: “On September 13, 2011, Apotheker stated: “we have a pretty rigorous process inside HP that we follow for all of our acquisitions, which is a DCF-based model, and we try to take a very conservative view at this… we have and are running an extremely tight and very professional due diligence process…Autonomy is a publicly-traded company in the UK and they are, therefore, audited like any other FTSE company, and they’re being audited on very professional standards.” (p36).

From HP’s re-filed Autonomy accounts for 2010 we see that they are in agreement that there has been no change in Autonomy’s historic cash flows as a result of the allegations. The new information shows the that number which has been changed is HP’s estimate of future prospects for the company, not its past accounting. The change in future prospects is dominated by the inability to deliver the synergies and the loss of most of the significant talent in the business due to the mismanagement.

Anatomy of the Deal

Long-Standing Target

This report shows that HP had been considering an acquisition of Autonomy as early as 2006 (p29) and had considered it a “[target] to be aggressively pursued” (p29).

That they had not done so until 2011 was largely due to Autonomy’s value. It was Leo Apotheker who considered the acquisition of Autonomy to be “transformational opportunity” (p29), a “game-changer” that would be “financially accretive” for the company. HP’s bankers also recommended the acquisition on the basis that Autonomy was “a crucial offensive move toward [HP’s] strategic vision and that [HP] should pursue the acquisition expeditiously” (p30).

This belies HP’s suggestion that Autonomy’s management was desperate to offload the company.

Autonomy was not driving the sale to HP

In its September 5th filing, HP presented one email, dated 10 December 2010, out of 17.5 million emails without giving its context to imply that Autonomy was “in a financial plane crash” and thus a radical solution was to sell the business to HP.

This is completely misleading as the emails around this date show, and which HP did not disclose. Autonomy, far from being in a financial meltdown was ahead of targets and, just two weeks later, delivered record results with operating profits of $376 million. The use of this email, out of context, by HP was dishonest in the extreme. Autonomy was not in financial free-fall, nor did it consider selling the company a necessity. Qatalyst Partners, the bank that handled the sales process, was not engaged by Autonomy until June 2011. The email below, just four days later from HP’s twisted version of events, shows that Autonomy’s forecast was on track to exceed analyst expectations for the quarter.

This email shows that Autonomy was forecasting revenue of $252 million on 14 December 2010, which was in excess of analyst expectations for Q4 2010, which were set at $241 million. 

Fear of Competitive Bids

In July 2011, HP’s board granted its approval for the HP’s management to proceed with its due diligence process, which new information shows followed standard market procedures. The data, according to KPMG, “were comparable to those available in other acquisitions involving large UK public companies” (P56) and “UK due diligence experts confirmed “access to due diligence materials reflected standard UK market practices for acquisitions of FTSE 100 Companies” (P56). HP’s bankers had warned of “interloper interest” (p31), which were identified as “including IBM, Oracle, Google, EMC and SAP” (p31).

Deloitte

On 17 August, KPMG and HP held a “one-hour” call with Deloitte in which Autonomy’s auditor responded to a series of questions about “revenue recognition, instances of fraud, control weaknesses, significant issues communicated to Autonomy’s board, disagreements with management and unadjusted audit differences” (p32). This was the only conversation that took place with Deloitte in the due diligence process. KPMG considered there were “no material issues” as a result of this conversation, although they failed to update a draft report to the board that had been prepared on August 9. Just 24 hours after that call with Deloitte, HP publicly announced their intent to acquire Autonomy.

Announcement

Despite their thorough due diligence, when HP’s shareholders reacted negatively to the announcements HP made in its Q3 earnings, “HP asked certain of its advisors whether HP could back out of the deal” (p10 HP amended answer 5 June 2014 court filing).

Shortly after the acquisition, and in panic mode, HP fired Leo Apotheker and Shane Robison, architects of the deal. With nobody left to sponsor the integration, is it any wonder, then that Cathy Lesjak’s warning that HP “acquisitions did not meet performance expectations” were close to coming true?

The identity of the “whistleblower”

The document reveals that the “whistleblower” who met with HP’s management almost a year later, on 25th May 2012, was “a legacy Autonomy US official” (p2). All of Autonomy’s accounting books and accounting policies operated centrally in the UK office. We do not believe that Autonomy US had any qualified accountants employed at the time and certainly nobody with knowledge of IFRS.

Furthermore, we note from the document that the informant was commenting from a US GAAP perspective: “transaction involving Value Added Resellers that could pose questions under US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles” (p2). Autonomy reported under a different set of rules: International Financial Reporting Standards.

Conclusion

HP has consistently stated that Autonomy management sold hardware that HP did not know about and booked it as software. And that this was so well hidden that it was not known until the whistle blower came forward.

The above documents do not reflect these statements. Not only was the hardware clearly disclosed to the auditors, but the audit packs and related trial balance ledgers showing hardware were used by a large number of KPMG, HP E&Y accounting staff from day one without comment.

The new revelations also show the primary reason for the write down was HP’s inability to deliver on recklessly optimistic synergies and its inability to deliver those, not accounting issues at Autonomy.

By using partial leaks, HP continues to try to duck these issues and avoid the errors of its mismanagement and the errors of its 20th November statement coming to light.

The full court filing can be found at:
http://www.scribd.com/doc/239402516/Addendum-to-HP-court-filing-09-04-2014

[1] Leo Apotheker at the Deutsche Bank Technology Conference on 13th September 2011: “Autonomy will be, on day one, accretive to HP. For FY 2012, Autonomy, once we integrate it, is accretive to HP…… Now, we have identified five synergy possibilities– five synergy leverages on how we can build up the Autonomy business and how we can synergize it between HP and Autonomy.”

2] Bloomberg: “HP’s Accounting Claims are Seen as Cover for Bad Deals” 21 November 2012

[3] Bloomberg: “HP Plunges on $8.8 Billion Charge From Autonomy Write down” 20 November 2012

[4] Reuters: “HP alleges Autonomy wrongdoing, takes $8.8 billion charge” 20 November 2012

[5] Hewlett-Packard Q4 2012 Earnings Call

[6] AllThingsD: “What Exactly Happened at Autonomy” 20 November 2012

[7]HP memorandum in support of the settlement and in opposition to the motions to intervene and sever, filed in California September 5, 2014 p.ii & p.12



 

The Documents HP didn’t show

HP today published an email from former Autonomy CFO Sushovan Hussain to former CEO Mike Lynch, from 10 December 2010, which it claims is evidence of a “CFO in panic” about the performance of the business. It contends this situation caused Mr Lynch to decide to sell the whole company to HP.

This email is taken wildly out of context, reflecting the CFO’s frustrations about the forecasting by parts of the sales force, and how that tracked against internal forecasts. HP has purposefully not shown other emails in the series, showing that Autonomy was on track to meet its expected revenues for the quarter, and indeed did so.

Analyst expectations for Q4 2010 were for revenue of $241 million. The following email shows that the forecast for Q4 on 13 December, despite the concerns in the U.S. identified on 10 December, was still $252 million:

HP Autonomy email

The final result for the quarter came in at $244.5 million, reflecting the fact that some of the revenue had not come in as indicated in the mail of 10 December, but still ahead of market expectations. Below is a copy of the final financial statement that was released to the market:

HP Autonomy Financial Statement

HP is taking an isolated incident to try to paint a picture of a company that was in some way in trouble. The email it has posted actually shows that Autonomy was trying hard to beat market expectations by a significant distance, and the frustrated overreaction of a stressed executive to the management of its internal sales forecasts. It has overlooked the fact that Autonomy delivered on market expectations, and the revenue was converted into cash.

Further, HP is suggesting that this situation led Mike Lynch to take the “radical action” of selling the whole company to HP. This is insanity. Not least because HP had already approached Autonomy about buying it!

This approach by HP is shameful and purposefully misleading. The full facts show that everything was handled properly, nothing was hidden and Autonomy was a strong business performing well. It is HP’s allegation of a “multi billion dollar fraud” that is imaginary.

 

Response to HP out of context court filing

Responding to a court filing made by HP today, a spokesperson for the former Autonomy management team said:

“What we see here is one email taken out of context. The emails around it, which HP has decided not to disclose, show that, although Mr Hussain was extremely frustrated with the unreliability of forecasting of certain sections of the sales force, the company’s forecast for the quarter, even taking out these deals, was still ahead of target. And indeed, the quarter was successfully delivered three weeks later. It is not hard, when going through hundreds of thousand of emails to pick a misleading example if you are prepared not to release other emails around it. The radical action referred to, was the termination of the unreliable sales reps.”

“HP is trying to smear us by leaking partial information and half-truths, here behind the defamation shield of a court filing. After three years, when HP finally starts putting out a case, it turns out to be built on a handful of assumptions that can all be explained, have never been put to the Autonomy team, and prove absolutely nothing. A large number of documents they have chosen not to release show the reality of the situation: that Autonomy was completely open with its auditors, and all accounting details were known to HP and its advisers long before they decided to take a write down. The real story here is HP’s utter mismanagement of Autonomy, which Meg Whitman is attempting to cover up through an increasingly bitter attack campaign. We will not be her scapegoat.”

Response to details in the filing:

HP has posted a long court filing containing many partial pieces of information, taken out of context and used to draw false conclusions. Much of this information has already been selectively leaked to the media. (It should be noted that this information has nothing to do with the actual issue before the court, which is whether HP should be allowed to pay up to $48 million to a group of lawyers to settle a case against it by HP’s shareholders, a settlement Sushovan Hussain has challenged as corrupt.)

Within the document, four further things are mentioned that we respond to below:

Due Diligence

The due diligence information was provided to HP in the format it requested. It was not interested in which resellers’ deals had gone through, but the industries of the intended end users.

Vatican and VAR deals

The fact that a VAR had not sold through to its intended end user is not relevant under IFRS. The VAR decided to become part of this deal so that when the project got underway, it could undertake the services contracts. The Vatican project was substantive and well publicized by the Vatican at the time, including on TV. To claim that the Vatican deal was fake is unsupportable: emails show a large amount of work with the Vatican and that at the time, they were on the verge of signing the deal.

Hosted contracts

The handling of hosted contracts was fully and transparently handled by Deloitte, who concurred with the accounting treatment. Furthermore, the methodology by which these were recognized was discussed with HP and its advisors in detail before the acquisition. Emails show that HP’s CFO and other senior accounting staff were also intimately aware of how Autonomy accounted for hosted deals early on in the acquisition, and played active roles in discussing how this would be converted using US GAAP. The HP CFO expressed no concern about the accounting treatment.

OEM

The definition of OEM is made clear in Autonomy’s annual report and is not the definition now being used by HP. Furthermore, this was discussed in detail with HP before the acquisition.

Hardware

We know that in compiling its adjustments to revenue HP has excluded Autonomy’s hardware sales. This is at odds with its own version of the Autonomy accounts filed with the UK statutory regulator, in which they handled the hardware in exactly the same way. Furthermore, a number of emails and documents show that the highest levels of HP management were well-aware of Autonomy’s hardware sales long before any alleged whistleblower came forward. HP also continued to do the same after it owned the company. The hardware sales were fully disclosed to the auditors and covered in the audit packs, which HP and its advisers had access to. In fact, prior to the acquisition, HP even supplied some of the hardware Autonomy re-sold.

The ledgers of the company and the audit packs show that hardware was correctly booked as “hardware” under the heading “hardware”. These ledgers were reviewed in detail by Hewlett Packard and its advisers.

In short, on 20 November 2012, HP made unsubstantiated allegations in order to justify a rushed write down within that financial year. But it simply hadn’t substantiated those allegations at the time and now can’t back out of that story. HP’s own version of the Autonomy accounts shows that there is no cash missing. This is the simplest fact that shows these allegations are untrue. This was real business and Autonomy got paid for it. On 20 November 2012, HP claimed the alleged wrongdoing was incredibly well-concealed. Since then, many internal HP emails have surfaced showing they were well aware of Autonomy’s accounting practices, and were comfortable with them. The Autonomy audit packs, which HP had access to immediately and were reviewed by it and its advisers, also surfaced all of these items in full clarity.

What we see here is a resumption of partial leaking and smear tactics, which have characterized HP’s behaviour from the outset. We note that Deloitte continues to state that it is fully confident in its work in relation to Autonomy.

Reaction to HP’s Settlement of Shareholder Lawsuit

It seems Meg Whitman will be using a large sum of HP’s money to avoid explaining in court why she made false allegations regarding Autonomy in November 2012. We continue to reject HP’s allegations, and note that over recent months a number of documents have emerged that prove Meg Whitman misled her shareholders. We hope this matter will now move beyond a smear campaign based on selective disclosure and HP will finally give a full explanation.

 

 

 

Open letter from Mike Lynch to the shareholders of Hewlett-Packard

Today HP will hold its annual shareholder meeting. This meeting provides a moment of accountability for HP’s Board of Directors to all its stakeholders, and is an appropriate time for the Board to address material questions.

A significant issue for HP’s stakeholders is the allegations HP has made against the former management team of Autonomy in relation to the acquisition of that company, and the related impairment charge of $8.8 billion taken against shareholder funds. As a member of the former management team of Autonomy I have a shared interest with the shareholders of HP (of which I am not one) in getting to the bottom of those allegations, understanding exactly what happened within HP related to this situation and resolving it as soon as possible.

We therefore put forward some questions that we believe HP’s Board of Directors needs to answer at the shareholder meeting:

1. Can the Board provide details and evidence of the allegations it has made against the former management team of Autonomy to shareholders and to the people it has accused, so that everyone can understand the allegations that are being made and how it relates to the decisions and statements the Board has made? Can the Board confirm when it first became aware of these specific allegations? Will the Board provide the report from PwC on which its allegations are based to the former Autonomy management team so that this issue can move toward resolution? Will the Board also make available the conclusions of the findings of the recently appointed committee investigating the circumstances of the acquisition?

2. How did HP calculate the impairment charge it has taken against Autonomy? Several qualified commentators, including a former Chief Accountant of the SEC, have questioned how the alleged irregularities in Autonomy’s accounting could generate such a large write-down. How much of the impairment charge was related to the operating performance of Autonomy post-acquisition?

3. Did HP approach the UK Takeover Panel at any stage in an attempt to rescind its offer to buy Autonomy before completion? If so what was the reason it gave and why was this material change of view not communicated to shareholders?

4. The former management of Autonomy began alerting Ms Whitman as early as December 2011 to significant problems with the integration of Autonomy into HP that were negatively impacting its performance. When did Ms Whitman acknowledge that Autonomy was not performing against expectations? Why was this not communicated to shareholders at that time?

5. Will HP commit to behaving in a transparent manner in providing information about these allegations and the legal processes that have been set in motion? This includes not pre-empting announcements by regulatory authorities and not waiting long periods to disclose information.

We continue to reject the allegations made against us by HP and believe it is in the interests of all parties that these questions be addressed directly by the Board so this issue can be resolved as swiftly as possible. HP has acted in an aggressive and unusual manner throughout this episode, making highly damaging public accusations without providing any supporting evidence, either to the public or to the people they have accused.

As we have said before, we believe the problem with the Autonomy acquisition by HP lies in the mismanagement of that business by HP under its ownership, making it impossible for Autonomy to deliver on HP’s expectations. Autonomy’s accounts were fully audited by Deloitte throughout the period in question and Deloitte has confirmed that it conducted its audit work in full compliance with regulation and professional standards. We refuse to be a scapegoat for HP’s own failings.

Dr. Mike Lynch

Statement in response to announcement of FRC investigation

We note the announcement by the UK’s Financial Reporting Council (FRC) that it has begun an investigation of the financial reporting of Autonomy for the period from 1 January 2009 to 30 June 2011. As a member of the FTSE 100 the accounts of Autonomy have previously been reviewed by the FRC, including during the period in question, and no actions or changes were recommended or required.

We welcome this investigation. Autonomy received unqualified audit reports throughout its life as a public company. This includes the period in question, during which Autonomy was audited by Deloitte. We are fully confident in the financial reporting of the company and look forward to the opportunity to demonstrate this to the FRC.

HP is back-tracking

“In a message posted on this website a week ago today, we urged Meg Whitman to use HP’s annual 10-K filing to provide a full explanation of the allegations of alleged accounting impropriety at Autonomy which she made on November 20. Unfortunately, she did not do so. HP finally filed its 10-K yesterday, more than a week later than usual, but again failed to provide any detailed information on the alleged accounting impropriety, or how this could possibly have resulted in such a substantial write down.

HP’s failure to provide us and its own shareholders with clarity on these crucial issues does not come as much of a surprise. Ever since putting out those very serious but non-specific allegations last month, HP has refused to disclose either the substance of its allegations or any supporting evidence.

In fact, HP’s 10-K filing appears to raise many more questions than it answers. Having had further time to study HP’s filing since it was released near midnight last night (UK time), it is apparent that a number of the statements contained within the filing are materially different from HP’s previous commentary on these issues. It also appears that the company is back-tracking on a number of key points that under-pinned its original allegations:

1. How much of the Autonomy write down is actually being blamed on alleged accounting improprieties?

In its November 20 statement, HP stated that “The majority of [the Autonomy] impairment charge, more than $5 billion, is linked to serious accounting improprieties, misrepresentation and disclosure failures” committed by “former members of Autonomy’s management team”. However, HP’s 10-K filing refers much more equivocally to a $5.7 billion goodwill impairment charge that “incorporates” the alleged accounting improprieties at Autonomy. So, how much of the $5.7 billion is being directly attributed by HP to alleged accounting improprieties, and how much should in fact be attributed to other changes in business performance, earnings projections and discount rate?

2. Does HP have facts or beliefs?

In its November 20 statement, HP was definitive in accusing “former members of Autonomy’s management team” of “serious accounting improprieties, misrepresentation and disclosure failures”, stating these matters as fact. However, HP’s 10-K filing is materially weaker, referring to its interpretation of alleged accounting improprieties which it “believes” to have taken place at Autonomy. Why did it make such definitive assertions before any independent assessment of the matter, and why is it less confident now than it was a month ago?

3. Why does the 10-K contain less detail than its last statement?

HP’s November 20 statement clearly leveled the accusations at “former members of Autonomy’s management team”. However, HP’s 10-K filing does not repeat – let alone expand upon – this specific detail, or indicate who it is accusing of wrongdoing. Every time we ask for more information, we get less.

Today we renew the call for HP to release the PwC report on which its allegations are based, along with any other relevant supporting evidence that was behind the statements of November 20, and explain the material differences between those statements and the 10-K.

It is time for Meg Whitman to stop making allegations and to start offering explanations.”

Mike Lynch

Response to HP 2012 annual report filing

“It is extremely disappointing that HP has again failed to provide a detailed calculation of its $5 billion write down of Autonomy, or publish any explanation of the serious allegations it has made against the former management team, in its annual report filing today.

Furthermore, it is now less clear how much of the $5 billion write down is in fact being attributed to the alleged accounting issues, and how much to other changes in business performance and earnings projections. This appears to be a material change in HP’s allegations.

Simply put, these allegations are false, and in the absence of further detail we cannot understand what HP believes to be the basis for them.

We also do not understand why HP is raising these issues now given that Autonomy reported into the HP Finance team from the day the acquisition completed in October 2011, there was an extensive due diligence process and Autonomy was audited as a public company for many years.

We would particularly make the following points:

* HP’s CFO Cathie Lesjak and her team, plus a number of outside advisors, had access to all Autonomy accounts and documents from October 2011 onwards, and raised no issues.

* Beginning in November 2011, HP and KPMG reviewed Autonomy’s closing balance sheet in detail, and Ernst & Young reviewed Deloitte’s audit work papers.

* Beginning in October 2011, HP studied in detail Autonomy’s tax structure and transfer pricing as well as its revenue recognition practices (led by Paul Curtis, HP’s worldwide head of revenue recognition).

* An independent third party valuation of Autonomy’s assets was carried out in January 2012.

* Quarterly business reviews were held with Autonomy management, Meg Whitman and Cathie Lesjak to discuss Autonomy’s financial performance.

* HP has continued to sell and account for hardware alongside Autonomy software in the same way that Autonomy did for the year since the acquisition completed.

* Regarding differences between IFRS and US GAAP accounting standards, which appear to have a role in some of the allegations HP has made, Autonomy’s accounting policies were made clear in Autonomy’s 2010 annual report.

We also note the statement in HP’s annual report that it received confirmation from the US Department of Justice on 21 November 2012 (the day after HP’s first public statement), that the Department had opened an investigation. We can confirm that we have as yet had no contact from any regulatory authority. We will co-operate with any investigation and look forward to the opportunity to explain our position.

We continue to reject these allegations in the strongest possible terms. Autonomy’s financial accounts were properly maintained in accordance with applicable regulations, fully audited by Deloitte, and available to HP during the due diligence process.

We remain deeply concerned about how this process has been conducted, and believe it is in everyone’s interests for it to be resolved as soon as as possible.”

Mike Lynch

An update from Mike Lynch

Thank you for coming to this site over the past few weeks. It has now been over a month since Meg Whitman, the CEO of Hewlett Packard, launched a series of allegations against me and my former colleagues. This site will remain the place where we post information that is relevant for the outside world as we continue to reject these allegations.

I’m glad that people have taken the time to hear from me directly. I would also like to take this moment to thank everyone for the huge amount of support and friendly messages you have sent to us through the site. This has been a very difficult time and we appreciate your support a great deal.

Ever since Meg Whitman launched these accusations we have been asking what she meant. I’m sorry to say we have got no further and we are still waiting for her to explain her claims and provide the material on which they are based.

As I have said before, we do not understand the allegations, or how they could possibly add up to a write down of over $5 billion.

In the absence of greater clarity from Meg, we are looking now to HP’s 10-K filing that is due before the end of the year. This document should  contain information about finances and management that all American businesses are required to lodge each year with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. We look forward to HP providing in it a comprehensive disclosure and explanation of its position and calculations.

I won’t go into the detail of our rebuttal again, for it is set out clearly in the open letter published here on the site. All I will say is that I look forward to this situation being resolved as soon as possible.

The technology industry remains one of the most exciting areas in the world to live and work in. New innovations are taking place every day, all around us. I am looking forward to 2013 being another year of tremendous progress.

Thank you again for your interest and support.

Merry Christmas,

Mike Lynch

 

Mike Lynch publishes an open letter to Hewlett-Packard

Open Letter from Dr Mike Lynch to the Board of Directors of Hewlett-Packard

27 November 2012

To: The Board of Directors of Hewlett-Packard Company

On 20 November Hewlett-Packard (HP) issued a statement accusing unspecified members of Autonomy’s former management team of serious financial impropriety. It was shocking that HP put non-specific but highly damaging allegations into the public domain without prior notification or contact with me, as former CEO of Autonomy.

I utterly reject all allegations of impropriety.

Autonomy’s finances, during its years as a public company and including the time period in question, were handled in accordance with applicable regulations and accounting practices. Autonomy’s accounts were overseen by independent auditors Deloitte LLC, who have confirmed the application of all appropriate procedures including those dictated by the International Financial Reporting Standards used in the UK.

Having no details beyond the limited public information provided last week, and still with no further contact from you, I am writing today to ask you, the board of HP, for immediate and specific explanations for the allegations HP is making. HP should provide me with the interim report and any other documents which you say you have provided to the SEC and the SFO so that I can answer whatever is alleged, instead of the selective disclosure of non-material information via background discussions with the media.

I believe it is in the interest of all stakeholders, and the public record, for HP to respond to a number of questions:

  • Many observers are stunned by HP’s claim that these allegations account for a $5 billion write down and fail to understand how HP reaches that number. Please publish the calculations used to determine the $5 billion impairment charge. Please provide a breakdown of the relative contribution for revenue, cash flow, profit and write down in relation to:
    • The alleged “mischaracterization” of hardware that HP did not realize Autonomy sold, as I understand this would have no effect on annual top or bottom lines and a minor effect on gross margin within normal fluctuations and no impact on growth, assuming a steady state over the period;
    • The alleged “inappropriate acceleration of revenue recognition with value-added resellers” and the “[creation of] revenue where no end-user customer existed at the time of sale”, given their normal treatment under IFRS; and
    • The allegations of incorrect revenue recognition of long-term arrangements of hosted deals, again given the normal treatment under IFRS.
  • In order to justify a $5 billion accounting write down, a significant amount of revenue must be involved. Please explain how such issues could possibly have gone undetected during the extensive acquisition due diligence process and HP’s financial oversight of Autonomy for a year from acquisition until October 2012 (a period during which all of the Autonomy finance reported to HP’s CFO Cathie Lesjak).
  • Can HP really state that no part of the $5 billion write down was, or should be, attributed to HP’s operational and financial mismanagement of Autonomy since the acquisition?
  • How many people employed by Autonomy in September 2011 have left or resigned under the management of HP?
  • HP raised issues about the inclusion of hardware in Autonomy’s IDOL Product revenue, notwithstanding this being in accordance with proper IFRS accounting practice. Please confirm that Ms Whitman and other HP senior management were aware of Autonomy’s hardware sales before 2012. Did Autonomy, as part of HP, continue to sell third-party hardware of materially similar value after acquisition? Was this accounted for by HP and was this reported in the Autonomy segment of their accounts?
  • Were Ms Whitman and Ms Lesjak aware that Paul Curtis (HP’s Worldwide Director of Software Revenue Recognition), KPMG and Ernst & Young undertook in December 2011 detailed studies of Autonomy’s software revenue recognition with a view to optimising for US GAAP?
  • Why did HP senior management apparently wait six months to inform its shareholders of the possibility of a material event related to Autonomy?

Hewlett Packard is an iconic technology company, which was historically admired and respected all over the world. Autonomy joined forces with HP with real hopes for the future and in the belief that together there was an opportunity to make HP great again. I have been truly saddened by the events of the past months, and am shocked and appalled by the events of the past week.

I believe it is in the best interests of all parties for this situation to be resolved as quickly as possible.

I am placing this letter in the public domain in the interests of complete transparency.

Yours faithfully,

Dr. Michael R. Lynch

Statement from Former Management Team of Autonomy

20 November 2012

HP has made a series of allegations against some unspecified former members of Autonomy Corporation PLC’s senior management team. The former management team of Autonomy was shocked to see this statement today, and flatly rejects these allegations, which are false.

HP’s due diligence review was intensive, overseen on behalf of HP by KPMG, Barclays and Perella Weinberg. HP’s senior management has also been closely involved with running Autonomy for the past year.

It took 10 years to build Autonomy’s industry-leading technology and it is sad to see how it has been mismanaged since its acquisition by HP.